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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH, by and through its
ROAD COMMISSION,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

vs.

Case No.

BETTY LeSOURD, a woman, ALEX T.
DA VIES and THELMA DAVIES, his
wife, and VALLEY BANK & TRUST
COMPANY,

11866

Defendants and Respondents.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action in eminent domain. In September
rn67, the State Road Commission filed its Complaints in the
District Court of Summit County to condemn a part of
the larger property of Alex and Thelma Davies and their
daughter, Betty LeSourd, Respondents herein, said property
being described in three tracts,1 for the development and
1 Said parcels, 4:28, 4:28H, and 4:28G, were described by the State
in its Complaints as being in the ownership of the Davies and LeSourd
and there was no dispute as to the ownership by these Defendants of
the same (R. 4, 13).
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construction of Interstate Highway I-80. The appeal herein
is taken by the State from the Findings of Fact, Conclusions
of Law and Judgment of Just Compensation, entered by
District Judge Swan on April 17, 1969, on claimed errors
of law.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The owner admitted and the trial Court found that
the Road Commission was authorized to condemn and that
the requisite finding of public use and necessity was made
as Ito .the Respondents' property (R. 49). The case thereafter was set down for trial on the issues of Just Compen&ation to be paid to the owners for the expropriation of the
property condemned and for damages to their remaining
property caused by the taking and the construction of the
highway facility (Tr. 2, R. 49). It was not until the first
day of trial that the State gave any indication that it intended to raise any question as to rtitle of 1the Landowners'
property (Tr. 14-17, 19-22) .2
After trial of better than three days on the ownership
issue and an ensuing three days of trial on the issue of the
market value of the land and improvements condemned and
the damages to the remainder, the Court entered Findings
2While we do not urge any absolute doctrine of waiver by or estoppel on the part of the State, it is nonetheless the fact that no notice
was given to the landowners by the State regarding title in a,ny pleading or pre-trial hearing prior to the commencement of the trial on the
issues of Just Compensation. This was in full view of the fact that
the landowners had clearly asserted their ownership and possession in
and to land remaining and lying outside of the condemned area and
that the same had been substantially and irreparably damaged ( R.
30-33); no reply was filed to the Defendants' Answer i.n accordance
with Rule 7, U.R.C.P., although the circumstances would have suggested that such would have been appropriate.

3
of Fact, Conclusions of Law and a Judgment of Just Compensation, pursuant to Rule 52 U.R.C.P. (R. 48-55).
The Motions of the State for a new trial on the ground
of errors in law, and alternatively for remittitur were denied by the trial Court on September 10, 1969 (R. 56, 57).
RELIEF SOUGHT BY STATE ON APPEAL
The Road Commission herein requests that the Judgment of the trial Court be reversed and that the case be
remanded for new trial.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
State's counsel has failed to set forth in his Brief the
facts elicited at the trial which underi.vrite and support
the Findings, Conclusions and Judgment of Judge Swan.
Rather, State counsel has given a portrait of only those
facts relevant to an issue which has been newly invented
for the purpose of this Appeal, viz., adverse possessfon, a
subject which did not play even a latent part of the trial
of the case. Consequently, in order that the Court be
apprised of the issues framed for trial, of the theory, evidence of these. Landowners and the State on ownership,
possession and concomitant entitlement to Just Compensation, and Findings and Conclusions upon which the Judgment herein is predicated, Respondents find it necessary
to make their own statement of the record of trial pursuant
to 75 (p) (2) U.R.C.P.
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1. Nature of the Property Prior to Condemnation.

The total tract 3 of the Landowners consltiituted 6.27 acres
of real property (Tr. 571), upon which were located substantial commercial improvements consisting of a restaurant, service station and cabin area (Tr. 70, 278). The property was known throughout the State as the "Kimball
Junction Cafe and Service Station." Located at the junction of U.S. Highway 40 and the Snyderville Highway to
Park City in Summit County (Tr. 586), the property was
located on a swing corner giving it direct access to U.S.
Highway 40 and unlimited access to the Park City roadway
thus serving the traveling public between Salt Lake City
and Park City, Eastern Utah, Colorado, Wyoming, etc.
(Tr. 300, 572, 575). That the situs, access, location, actual
use of the property and potential use in the reasonably
foreseeable future was for a commercial restaurant, service station and tourist development site was undisputed in
the evidence of both parties (Tr. 383, 502, 575, 621).
Throughout the years, the restaurant had been substantially and continually remodeled and upgraded. Cabins
at the rear of the property were rented year round by tourists, travelers, hunters and fishermen; they too, had been
completely remodeled (Tr. 287).
Utilizing the employment of ten to twelve people
throughout the year on a twenty-four hour basis in the
operation of the restaurant and service station (Tr. 294295), the stJaJtion pumped between 135,000-+- iand 161,000
3The subject property is portrayed in yellow on the base map of
trial Exhibit 1 reproduced and attached hereto in this Brief.
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gallons of gasoline (Tr. 300) and sale from all services were
in excess of $117,000.00 in the year prior to condemnation.
Portions of the south and west sections of the property
were not physically utilized but the highest and best use
of the same as of September 1967, was 1as a motel site
(Tr. 305).
Contrary to the representation of State counsel in his
Brief, the Defendants' property had not been indiscriminately used by the public as a thoroughfare, but rather
served as an entrance to and exit from the commercial
improvements situated on the larger property (Tr. 109-111).
2. The Subject Property After Condemnation.

The State in its Complaint, condemned .42 of an acre
of land across the entire commercial frontage of the Defendants' property, resulting in a total taking of all of the
landowners' easements and rights of access to U.S. Highway 40 and the Park City Highway (Tr. 402). The southerly edge of the right of way line of the State came within
less than one foot of the service station pumps on the Defendants' property (Tr. 311); the taking ripped out the
sanitary system and commercial storage tanks and as well
changed the grade of the remaining property (Tr. 118119, 406).
The remainder property lost its "swing corner influence" as a result of the expropriation and its sole means
of access was forsaken for a newly constructed local service
farm road (Tr. 514, 595, 596). 'Dhe
of the prop-
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erty for commercial use was substantially impaired as a
result of the acquisition (Tr. 466, 595).
As a result of the foregoing, commercial operations on
the subject property were no longer economically feasible
and the Landowners were forced to discontinue business
thereon (Tr. 311, 312).

The testimony is undisputed on both sides that after
condemnation, the highest and best use of the subject property changed from commercial service station-restaurant
useage to agriculturail-transitional (Tr. 513). However, the
appraiser for the State did contend that the remaining
property could be possibly used for an out-of-the-way "beer
hall" (Tr. 662).
3. The Ownership Question.

At the outset of the trial the State raised, for the first
time, the issue of ithe Landowners' rtri.tle, claiming that a portion of the remaining property after condemnation was not
owned by the Defendants (Tr. 14-17, 19-22). After extended
argument of counsel, the Court set down precise and clear
procedural guidelines as to how the issue of ownership was
to be resolved. The Court held that there was an issue of
lbiitJle, that the Landowners 'had the burden ·af establishing
a prima facie case with respect thereto and that suck prima
facie case could be established by evidence indicating that
the subject property was under quiet and peaceable possession by the Defendants under claim of ownership and color
of title (Tr. 57). Judge Swan further determined that if
the Defendants met such burden, the Road Commission
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would be responsible for calling witnesses to assert or claim
an interest in the subject property foreign to that of these
Defendants (Tr. 57). The establishment of the rule by the
Court was premised upon the admitted case and treatise
authority (Tr. 35, 36, 51, 57).
The State did not register an objection to this ruling,
nor did it object to the procedure upon which the ruling was
predicated; nor did it aver or allege that the question of
adverse possession was the guiding issue (Tr. 57). Rather,
within the framework of the trial Court's ruling, both the
Landowners and :tJhe StaJte proceeded to present evidence
regarding the question of ownership.

4. Evidence on Ownership.
(a) The Landowners' evidence.

The evidence was undisputed tllrat the Landowners, as
of September 1967, had occupied, possessed, fenced in part,
improved, and used the subject property of 6.27 acres for
better than 15 years (Tr. 70, 72, 82-83). During that time,
no person whomsoever manifested or assented any c1a;im,
right, title or interest in and to said land (Tr. 82, 90-91).
And the evidence was that no other individual had used
or occupied any part of the said premises in a manner inconsistent with the quiet and peaceable possession of the
Defendants during the 15 year period. The testimony indicated that it was not unltil 1965 h t these Landowners had
notice that their record title did not conform to the property actually under possession and claim of ownership (Tr.
73, 82, 85). At that time, the Defendants had the entire
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property surveyed, documentary title was executed and
placed on record of the survey description, the County Assessor was notified of the same, and the Defendants from
1965-1967 made payment of real property taxes on the entire
6.27 acres (Tr. 82, 83, 95, 153).
(b) The State's evidence.

The State produced no witnesses claiming or asserting
any interest or ti,iJle in the subject propecly foreign to the
interests of these Defendants with the exception of two
fragmented parcels on each end of the property as to which
the State, itself, asserted an interest (R. 45) .4 In other
respects, the State produced only the testimony of an abstractor (Tr. 167) and a Road Commission staff attorney
(Tr. 219), both of whom limited their testimony to the
veritable jumble of documentary recordings, inconsistent
chains of title, overlapping and gapping instruments found
in the Recorder's office of Summit County. Neither the
State's abstractor, its title attorney nor any other witness
made a physical inspection of the property to determine
possession nor did they talk with any person who claimed
any inter:est fa ithe
properlty foreign to tllese Dandowners (Tr. 198, 225-229). The State's title attorney had
no knowledge or opinion as to any possesory interest in the
subject property (Tr. 229). The State's evidence further
indicated that there were no documents of any type specifically relating to the subject property during the period
which these Defendants had been in possession which pur4Such parcels were excluded by the Court in favor of the State
from the total tract of these Defendants prior to trial on the issue of
Just Compensation.
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ported in any way to divest, encumber or jeopardize the
interests, c1laims of ownership and documentary recordings
of the Defendant-"landowners.
As it turned out, the only property of the 6.27 acres as
to which the State disputed the ownership of these Defendants was a portion of the rearage land. Such property
involved a difference of but $3,900.00 between the value
evidence of the State Road Commission and that of the
Defendants (Tr. 419, 667, 693).
(c) Additional evidence of ownership.

At the end of the State's testimony on title, the Summit County attorney entered his appearance in behalf of
the County (Tr. 229) and unequivocally stated that as to
the 6.27 acres under the possesion, claim of ownership and
color of title of these landowners, Summit County made no
claim of any right, title or interest in and to the same (Tr.
230). It was further adduced that former County right-ofway through the property of these Defendants had not been
used as a public highway since the late 1930's, that the
County had not asserted any claim to or use of the same
since that time, that the same had not been open as a
right-of-way to the traveling public, that these Defendants
had continuously occupied, possessed and fenced in part
such property since 1952 and that in the fall of 1965, the
County Commission, in open hearing "agreed" to abandon
the old County right-of-way under the 1927 deed (Tr. 73,
80-81, 237, 239, 244).
5. Ruling of Trial Court on Ownership of Property.
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After submission of all the evidence on ownership,
the lower Court, consistent with its initial ruling as heretofore outlined, determined that the Landowners iherein had
met their burden of proof of establishing a prima facie case
of ownership of the 6.27 acres shown in yellow on Exhibit
1, that the Road Commission had not overcome that prima
facie showing by the introduction of any evidence of asserted claims or interests in said land foreign to the possession, interest, and ownership of these Defendants and
that accordingly, the 6.27 acres was to be considered for
the purposes of condemnation, as being that of these Defendants (Tr. 267). The trial Court further concluded
that the Road Commission, with respect to the two parcels
on each end of the larger piece (R. 45), had overcome the
Defendants' prima facie showing regarding the same by
virtue of the Quitclaim Deed from Summit County (Tr.
266).
6. Trial Court's Determination of Just Compensation.

Predicated upon the Court's determination of the ownership issue, the case proceeded to trial on the issues of
Just Compenmtion. The Landoiwnel'IS produced lfu.ree witnesses, all from Salt Lake City, whose opinions on the fair
market value of the property condemned and the damages
to the remainder were, respectively:
Werner Kiepe
(Tr. 605)

$78,400.00

Jerome H. Mooney
(Tr. 520)

$83,008.00

Marcellus Palmer
(Tr. 423)

$79,900.00
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The sole witness of the Road Commission was from
Provo, whose total value opinion was:
Gregory Austin
(Tr. 685)

$34,500.00

The State's witness acknowledged that the highest and
best use of the subject property for commercial purposes
had been destroyed by reason of the condemnation acquisition, that the sale of the remainder property would meet
substantial buyer resistance, and that most of the commercial improvements, i.e., service station, storage tanks, gasoline pumps, cabin sites and the predominant portion of the
restaurant had only salvage value remaining (Tr. 662, 667,
704, 725-726, 734).
The Court found that by reason of the State expropriation, the prime access to U. S. Highway 40 and the Park
City roadway had been taken, that the property could no
longer feasibly and economically be used for commercial
purposes and that the highest and best use of the remnant
property after condemnation was speculative and transitional (R. 51). The Court determined that Just Compensation for the acquisition and remainder damages was a
compromise between the eviidence of ,fue Landowners and
the State of $65,992.00 (R. 51).
ARGUMENT
POINT I
CONTRARY TO THE CLAIM OF STATE COUNSEL,
THE ISSUE OF ADVERSE POSSESSION WAS NOT
RAISED IN THE LOWER COURT AND IS NOT NOW
HERE ON APPEAL.
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The State rests its appeal in this case on the singular
point that the Defendants did not make a case of adverse
possesion. At the outset, therefore, it should be made very
clear that this case does not involve, nor has it ever involved
(as State's counsel would have the Court believe) any issue,
question or claim of adverse possession by these Landowners. The Landowners never rested their case on ownership
of any of the property under consideration on any ethereal
argument of adverse possession and the question was not
debated, expressly or by innuendo, at any point of 1trial in
the lower Court. The State's Brief misses the whole thrust
of the Defendants' case on ownership. Their position was
and is that open and continuous use, possession and claim
to the 6.27 acres for better than 15 years under color of
title is sufficient to establish a prima facie case of ownership as against all others except for one who clariins and
manifests a higher or better title. The record is beyond
dispute that these owners had been for upwards of 20
years in quiet and peaceable possession of the subject property under color of title without any claimant having ever
asserted any right, mtle or interest in and Ito the property.
Thus the State was never confronted with the issue of
adverse possession, or of who, as between two or more
adverse claimants, was entitled to compensation. The laborious treatise of State counsel in his Brief on the elements
of adverse possession, on the long recognized doctrine that
adverse possession cannot be maintained as against the
sovereign, and on the argument that these Landowners did
not make a sufficient showing of adverse possession, totally

I
....._
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misses the mark of the lower Court's ruling, ignores three
days of testimony spent on the issue of ownership, and fails
to even mention the authorities upon which the trial Judge
obviously predicated his ruling.
It is sufficient to note at this juncture that the title
1Jo ithe property condemned by the State was lindispumbly
vested in the Defendants. App. Br. p. 26. Accordingly,
there was no question but that the State did acquire full
record and posses•sory title and ownership to 'the property
sought in the action. The only query was whether the Defendants had established an adequate showing of ownership to the remaining property so as to entitle them to the
recovery of damages which had been undeniably sustained.
POINT II
THE RULING OF THE COURT ON OWNERSHIP OF
THE 6.27 ACRES WAS IN FULL ACCORDANCE
WITH RULING CASE LAW.

After better than a day of argument and proffers of
proof on the part of both counsel, the trial Court quite succinctly announced the rule that would govern and control
the resolution of the ownership question:
"The Court is of the opinion that in the light
of counsels' very comprehensive and enlightening
opening statements, the Court should at this time
find that there is an issue of title in the case, and
that that issue should be met by defendants moving
forward with their burden of proof; at least, Mr.
Campbell, to the point of establishing quiet possession under some claim of ownership or color of title
in the defendants. And then I believe that if that
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burden is met by defendants, we can then determine
whether the State has the witnesses that you refer
to who can come before this Court and claim an
interest in subject lands." (Tr. 57).
By such ruling, the trial Judge recognized and followed
the leading and only authority cited by the parties on the
question, Nicho1ls on Eminent Domain. Nichols states the
proposition to be that with respect to evidence of ownership of land not condemned but claimed to have been damaged by the condemnation:
"It is accordingly quite generally the law that,
in condemnation proceedings under authority of law,
proof of possession under claim of title will be
treated as prima facie evidence of ownership in fee,
and will be sufficient to entitle the person in such
possession to receive the compensation awarded for
the land, if no one showing a better title lays claim

to it."

2 Nichoils on Eminent Domain 28, §5.2[3]

The rationale of Judge Swan's ruling, uncontested as
it was by the State, and the authoritative statement of
Nichols are grounded upon the avoidance of imposing the
otherwise intolerable hardship upon a land-condemnee of
showing good title against all the world to severed property
remaining after condemnation where the public records
disclose the lack of a perfect chain of record title, along with
possible clouds and stray instruments which have never
been discharged, released, or abandoned. In a word, this
well reasoned authority and ruling prevents a full scale
trial of a quiet title action regarding property not condemned by the State, but rn!ther possessed, fenced and opeirly
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occupied by the Defendants under clear color of title, which
had sustained permanent damage and as to which no one
had ever made any foreign claim prior to condemnation or
at any time.
Accordingly and to this end, the trial Court determined
that Davies and LeSourd had the initial burden of establishing quiet, peaceable and undisturbed possession of the
6.27 acres under color of title, and that thereupon, the State
had the responsibility of producing claimants who bona
fidely asserted an interest in such property as suggested by
the spurious and unconnected documents on the records
of the County Recorder. These landowners met and established their burden of proof by showing such quiet, undisturbed and peaceab1le possession of the subject property
shown in yellow on Exhibit 1 for better than 15 years under
full color of title during which time no person whomsoever
asserted any claim or interest against them. The State, on
the other hand, failed to produce one witness, who asserted
or would assert any claim in or to the property. Rather,
it chose to fall back on a hodge-podge of unrelated, inconsistent, overlapping and ancient documents of record. It
was just such an attempt on the part of the condemning
agency in challenging the tite of the landowner which, but
for such condemnation, would have obviously gone unchallenged by anyone, to avoid the condemning agency's constitutional and statutory obligation to pay full and just
compensation which the Court attempted to mitigate by
its ruling in the landmark decision of Perry v. Clissold,
(1907) A.C. 73 (a case cited favorably in Nichols on Eminent Domain Vol. 2 §5.2[3]) :
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"It could hardly have been intended or contemplated that the Act should have the affect of

shaking titles which, but for the Act would have
been secure, and would in the process of time become absolute and indisputable, or lthat rthe Gov-

ernor, or responsible Ministers acting under his
instructions should take advantage of the infirmiity
of anybody's title in order to acquire his land for
nothing."

The rule in Perry is a corollary to the long established
principal of the common law that a trespass is an injury
to possession and that possession under claim of title is good

as against aU the world except one actually claiming a superior title. As a trespasser cannot def end against one in
possession by proving that record title to the property is
in a third party, neither can the condemning body in an
eminent domain suit shirk its constitutional obligation to
pay Just Compensation by attacking the title of a party
in quiet and peaceable possession. Morrison v. Hinkson, 87
Ill. 587 (1878); LaFayette v. Wortman, 107 Ind. 404, 8 NE
277 (1886). This Court has followed the footstep authority
of Perry as recognized in Nichols in the case of Ketchum

Coal Company v. District Court of Carbon County, et al,
48 Utah 432, 159 Pac. 737 ( 1916). Therein, it was held
that a condemnor may not dispute a title of a party in
possession, for the purposes of assessment of just compensation, unless the condemnor, itself, holds or has acquired
a paramount title to the land. Justice Frick, writing for an
undivided Court, stated:
"The condemning party cannot dispute the title
of the party in pos session, iagaJi.nsrt 1whom proceedings
1
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have been instituted, unless such party had acquired
a paramount title."
1. Adverse Possession Againt the Sovereign Was Never
an Issue in This Case.

The prolonged argument of State counsel in
Brief
(pages 8-12) that ownership by adverse possession may not
be acquired by a private individual vis-a-vis the sovereign
is quite unnecessary to the disposition of this case. While
such hornbook rule of law is accurately stated, it is, as
noted in this Brief, plainly irrelevant to the issue of ownership before the trial Court and on appeal for the following
reasons:
(a) Adverse possession, as observed above, exists as an
issue only between two or more parties, each of
whom claim some interest in the same land. As
against all others, one in possession has perfect title
except as to another who actually asserts a recognized paramount interest.
(b) Judge Swan ruled that as to any property or parcels
in which the State claimed and proved a recognized
paramount interest, these Defendants had no right
or interest therein even though the Defendants might
otherwise have been in quiet, undisturbed and peaceable possession; and thus, to the extent any issue of
sovereignty was involved, the Court rwled in favor
of the State.
(c) The record is clear that neither the State Road Commission, Summit County, or any other sovereign en-
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tity, claimed any right, title or interest in or to any
part or portion of the remainder of land occupied
and possessed by the Defendants. In fact, Summit
County expressly diavowed and disclaimed any interest in the subject land within the "old County roadway" (Tr. 229-230). Consequently there were no
adverse claims asserted by the sovereign upon which
the trial Court was called upon to make a ruling.
2. The Statute of Frauds i,s not Avail,able to the State
Road Commission as a Defense.
For the premiere time in this Proceeding, State counsel in his Brief, raises the spurious contention that, somehow, ithe State of Uita;h is e:ruti1:Jled to avail irbself of the
defense or claim of the Statute of Frauds as against the
possessory rights and interest under color of title of these
Landowners. App. Br. page 15 para. 2.
Never during this trial did the State argue that the
Statute of Frauds, was even latently relevant. Nor did it
affirmatively plead such defense as required by Rule 8 (c)
U.R.C.P. Even if it had, the argument would have been
abortive, for besides the elementary and overriding rule as
staited by Nichols, supra and this Court in Ketchum Coal Co.,
supra, it is blackletter law that the Statute of Frauds, 255-1 U.C.A. 1953, is a personal defense available only to a
party to a parol contract and cannot be seized upon by an
unrelated third party. Demeter v. Annenson, 180 P.2d 998
(Cal. 1947); Powell v. Leon, 239 P.2d 974, (Kan. 1952);
Forrester v. Rock Island Oil & Refining Co., 323 P.2d 597,
(Mont. 1957); Dodge v. Davies, 179 P.2d 735, (Ore. 1947).
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Under the penumbra of events surrounding the ownership of the subject property, the Road Commission was not
a party to any of the transactions that occurred prior to
condemnation and its unprecedented claim to the protection
of the Statute of Frauds flies in the face of sound and established principals of common law.
3. The Rulings of the Trial Court were Consistent and

Comported with the Evidence and the Ru"le of the Case.
State counsel goes to the bottom of the well to urge,
on page 16 of his Brief, that the trial Court made
sistent determinations in ruling on the one hand, that land
granted to the State Road Commission via the Summit
County Quitclaim Deed was vested in the State, while at
the same time holding on the other hand that the ownership
of land under the "old County road" was, for purposes of
the eminent domain trial, vested in these Defendants by virtue of their continuous, quiet, undisturbed and peaceable
possession.
Any reasonable examination of the record quickly illustrates that the trial Court did not make inconsistent rulings
as claimed by the State. What Judge Swan did say was
that to the extent that the State Road Commission had
record fee title stemming from a Quitclaim Deed from Summit County, such title was paramount to the possessory
ownership and the clouded record title of the Defendants.
However, as to the 6.27 acres determined to be in the ownership of these Defendants, the State did not nor could it
assert a paramount record interest and Summit County,
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appearing through its County Attorney resolved any doubt
on the subject by expressly disclaiming any such paramount
interest. Judge Swan's determination, on the facts adduced,
was, therefore, quite consistent with the enunciated rule
that the Defendants' possessory ownership, based upon quiet
and undisturbed possession together with bona fide color
of title, was good against all with the world with exception
of a party actually asserting a determined superior right.
Such conclusionary ruling is in complete accord with the
manifest case law prevalent in a quiet title action, viz., a
disclaimer or non-appearance by a recorded interest negates
any legal force or validity which such interest might otherwise have. Herein, not only did Summit County expressly
disclaim any interest in the former County roadway, but
the former Chairman of the Summit County Commission,
Archie Pace, testified that Summit County resolved and
agreed in 1965 to abandon the alignment of the old road.
'The argument of State counsel on this point is unworthy of this Court's consideration.
POINT III
THE LEGAL PRINCIPAL OF UNITY OF OWNERSHIP AND UNITY OF USE IN EMINENT DOMAIN
ARE NOT HERE AT ISSUE.

State counsel urges that under the facts of the case
at Bar, or at least his version, these landowners have failed
to show unity of ownership and unity of use of the total
property before condemnation. See App. Br. pp. 16-22. The
argument is made with such anxiety that it by-passes the
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admi tted and uncorutrovel'lted fact that the property condemned, as well as the 1land underlying all of the commercial
improvements were under the common ownership of Davies
and LeSourd. 5 The contention of the lack of unity of ownership and use presupposes on the State's part that the
trial Court erred in its rulings on the issue of ownership
and that consequently there were at least five separate pal.'1cels under five separate ownerships. That is the best that
can be said of State counsel's argument.
1

If the lower Court in this case is correct in its initial

and ultimate rulings of ownership (which clearly it was),
then the conclusion is required that the subject property
met the ordinary tests of unity of ownership, unity of use
and unity of possession. While State counsel in his recitation of case authority is something less than completely
candid in his statement of the fact in Mcintyre v. Board of
County Commissioners, 211 P.2d 59 (Kan. 1949), and San
Benito County v. Copper Mountain Mining Company, 45
P .2d 428 (Cal. 1935), we have no quarrel with the recognized legal maxim that in a partial taking case, there must
be unity of ownership and actual or probable potential use
between the land taken and the land remaining. 6 But we
need not resort to authority from Kansas, California or
sAnd it was with respect to this land, title to which was not in
dispute herein, that predominately all severance damage was predicated (Tr. 419, 667, 693).
Glt is of importance to note that without exception, all the cases
cited by State counsel in support of the proposition of unity of ownership involved two or more adverse claimants, asserting adverse
ownership :(n two or more separate parcels or arose out of a circumstance where ownership admittedly was vested in the condemnee and a
third person. Such were not the facts of the instant case.
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other jurisdictions for such pristine concepts. Justice Callister stated the proposition as well as anyone in setting out
the facts of State of Utah v. W£lliams, et al, 22 U.2d 301,
452 P .2d 548 ( 1969) , and this Court addressed itself to the
question in some detail in North Salt Lake v. St. Joseph
Water and Irrigation Company, 118 Utah 600, 223 P.2d 577,
584 (1950).
Thus while time need not be lost in rebutting a doctrine, the correctness of which is uncontested, the relevant
application of that doctrine to the facts at hand is quite another thing. The best evidence that the issue is not appropriately under consideration herein, is the Plaintiff's own
Brief, for after rendering forth a role call of cases from
foreign jurisdictions, its argument on the point peters out
and is exhausted on page 22 of Apellant's Brief without any
attempt to tie it or apply it to the subject property or the
case at Bar. It is gainsaid that the term "owner" in general
real property parlance and in eminent domain proceedings
specifically, includes any person who has a legal or equitable interest in the land condemned or the remaining property. 2 Nichols of Eminent Domain §5.2[1] and authorities
therein cited; Campbell v. New Haven, 101 Conn. 173, 125
Atl. 650 (1924); Knoth v. Barclay, 8 Colo. 300, 6 Pac. 924
(1885). 78-34-7 of the Eminent Domain Code particularly
describes an owner as one being in occupation of the property. While possession alone obviously is not sufficient for
the establishment of a compensable interest in a condemnation suit, 7 the facts of this case clearly illustrate an inter7For example, a tenant at will, tenant at sufferance or mere parol
licensee.
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est in the subject property far beyond such minimal relation. As indicated herein, trial Court rulings on the ownership of Davies and LeSourd are fully sustained.
The claim of State counsel that there was a lack of
showing of unity of use in this case, because the landowners
had not applied every square inch of their property to the
commercial operation is clearly esoteric; in fact, the claim
misconceives the "concept of unity of use" altogether. The
rule is so well established in this jurisdiction by a legion
of cases that we need not belabor the question with authority that market value and highest and best use in eminent
domain are based upon not only the actual use being made
of the property in question but as well the potential uses
to which the property may be probably placed in the foreseeable future. The fact, therefore, that a portion of the
total property was, at the date the sheriff served his Summons, lying idle does not alter the clearly promulgated definition of unity of use in the Case. After nearly a week of
trial, the evidence on both sides was unqualified, that the
total property of the Defendants, prior to condemnation,
had a similar highest and best unity of use, viz., commercial.
The claim of the State on this point is incongruous.
POINT IV
THE DEFENDANT LANDOWNERS CLEARLY MET
THEIR BURDEN OF PROOF ON ALL PHASES OF
THE CASE.

Lastly, the State charges under Point II of its Brief,
that the Defendant-landowners failed in their burden of
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proof regarding ownership and the right to severance damage. The charge is followed by a recitation of Utah cases,
of value to this question only in showing that State counsel may have had occasion at on8 time or another, to read
them. Particular emphasis 1is put upon this Court's decision
in State of Utah v. Tedesco, 4 U.2d 31, 286 P.2d 785 (1955),
wherein it was held that as between two disputing cwimants
in property actuaUy condemned by the State for "This is
the Place Monument" in Salt Lake County, the claimant
urging an interest by virtue of a parol contract must sustain such interest by "clear and convincing evidence." The
rule of Tedesco is inapposite herein for such rule, pertaining to an oral and non-possessory estate in land, has nothing
to do with the positive proof of the Defendants herein of
quiet, peaceable and undisturbed possession of property
under color of title not of just the land condemned, but of
the remainder land as well.
The measuring rod required of a landowner in meeting
his burden of proof for entitlement to severance damage
has been raised by Road Commission special counsel in four
recent ca;ses: State of Utah v. Howes, et al., 20 U.2d 246,
436 P.2d 803 (1968); StaW, of Utah v. Style-Crete, Inc.,. 20
U.2d 365, 438 P.2d 537 (1968); State of Utah v. Bingham
Gas & Ou Co.,. 21 U.2d 66, 440 P.2d 260 (1968); 'and State
of Utah v. Williams, et al., supra; and 1Jhe Court has in
each case responded in olear and convirroing fashion. The
ruling law is thus clear tJhat a citizen, whose property is
condemned, is under no onerous burden of proving severance damage by "clear and convincing evidence," but rather,
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is required to satisfy only the ordinary "preponderance of
the evidence" rule. The State continues to raise the ques..;
tion and this Court continues to answer it in the same way.

CONCLUSION
The attempt of State counsel in this Appeal to disguise
the issues raised and the facts as presented at trial under
the untried question of adverse possesion is ill fated in this
Court. The contention was never made by the Defendants
nor was it the subject of any debate or issue before Judge
Swan. It should not now be the target for the first time
on appeal. In Re Ekker's Estate, 19 U.2d 414, 432 P.2d 45
(1967); Riter v. Cayias, 19 U.2d 358, 431 P.2d 788 (1967).
The Landowners' case on ownership, predicated upon undisturbed, peaceable and quiet possession of the subject
property for 15 years under color of title, satisfied the
uncontested case authority, warranted the ruling of the
trial Court, and dictated that the case proceed on to the
issues of Just Compensation. The State has raised no issue
in this Appeal with respect to the adequacy of proof on the
issues of market value and/or severance damage to support
the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment as
entered. The proof of ownership was not overcome by the
State's proffer of indiscriminate, inconsistent and stray
documents in the public records.
After better than six days of comprehensive trial on
all the issues, the Judgment as entered, premised upon
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fully adequate Findings and Conclusions should be, we do
respectfully submit, upheld and affirmed by this Court in
all respects.
Respectfully submitted,
ROBERT S. CAMPBELL, JR.
STEWART M. HANSON, JR.
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